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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In Re: ROBERT B. HANSEN 
No. 15605 
Disciplinary Proceeding 
APPELLANT'S REF Y BlUJ':I" 
met by oral argument. There are several points, however, 
where we deem it desirable to reply. 
POINT I. THE UTAH STATE BAR COMMISSION 
COULD NOT HAVE CONSIDERED THE 
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES 
The Bar Commission asserts at various places in its 
brief (see, for example, P.2) that the Bar Commission did 
consider the mitigating circumstances in arriving at its 
recommendation for a one-year sucope?.nsion. Otherwise, it 
argues, the recommended penalty would have been more severe. 
We pointed out in our initial brief that the findings are 
conclusionary in nature, and do not even purport to address 
the evidentiary matters relating to mitigation. We further 
noted that the evidence was not transcribed until after the 
Bar Commission had entered its order. The order is dated 
January 6, 1978. The evidence WdS transcribed January 18, 
1978. The hearing examiners, of course, heard the evidence, 
but the Bar Commission did not. We respectfully submit that 
the Court should not give substant iaJ 1·1cight to the Bar 
I 
.... 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-2-
Commission's recommendation, because the circumstances regard-
ing mitigation were never heard by or apparent from the record 
before the Bar Commission. The answering Brief does not make 
any attempt to answer these assertions. It merely £~asons 
that the Bar Commission must somehow have known the circum-
stances, because otherwise it would have recommended a more 
severe penalty. 
i PIELLJ\NT I :c: _OMl'J,/'.IN 1';; '\J;()lJ'f' 'l'JiJ: 
FINDINGS ON THE DICK MATTER ARE FULLY 
JUSTIFIED, EVEN THOUGH HE PREVAILED 
ON THAT ISSUE. 
Appellant has been tried and convicted in the press. 
The charges made against him in the complaint in the Dick 
matter were serious, but the evidence did not sustain the 
allegations of wrongdoing. The hearing examiners' negative 
findings in the Dick matter simply are not supported by the 
evidence. We have argued this in detail in our initial brief, 
and we won't reargue it here, but, for example, par. 7\b) 
is a finding that "Respondent [Appellant] apparently did not 
ascertain the identity of the fee title holder," when he 
prepared the contract of sale. This simply is not true. 
Appellant testified (R. 434) that he had a title report and 
he knew that Soelberg was the owner of the property. This is 
nowhere contradicted. The c .. mtract itself, whe:rrein the Dicks 
were the named purchasers, and American National Mortgage Co. 
was the seller, was introduced in evidence as Ex. 49. Par. 6 
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of that contract expressly states that it is understood, 
"there there presently exists an obligation against said pro-
perty in favor of LeRoy Soelberg, Sr. and Jean E. Soelberg, 
with an unpaid balance of $3 ,600 as of May 18, 1965," (Ex. 
49). Further, John R. Dick testified that Appellant told th~ 
that Soelbergs had an interest !Depos. p.10). He was a.sked 
if he knew Soelberg was the seller, and he t:estified, "J 
interest," and he explained that Appellant had so advised 
them (Depos. p.10). 
Thus, the charges in the complaint and Finding 7(b) not 
only are not sustained by the evidence, but they are con-
trary to the only evidence. Finding 7 (b) is a negative findin 
The hearing examiners and the Bar Commission, in approving 
the hearing examiners' report, ccncludc by 7(b) Lhat he was 
guilty of misconduct, but it was not bad enough to violate tlie 
Code of Professional Conduct. As a matter of fact, the 
finding is not true. It is not .supper tcd by any evidence, 
and the Appellant was fully justified in challenging, in hi~ 
initial brief, this and other similar negative findings on t~ 
Dick matter. They stand as an undeserved blemish on his 
record. 
The rest of our argument in the Dick matter is adequate1 1 
made in the opening brief, and we won't repeat it, but the 
Bar Commission is not entitled to enter findings which 
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cast the Appellant in an unfavorable light, and then assert 
in its brief here that Appellant should not be heard to 
complain. 
POINT III. THE BAR COMMISSION'S ORDER IS 
NOT ENTITLED TO A PRESUMPTION 
OF CORRECTNESS. 
On p.8 of the answering Brief, the Bar Commission 
asserts that the Appellant "may no~ simply urge his version 
of the facts upon this court when the Commission has rejected 
that version ... " Appellant's complaint here is that the 
hearing examiners did not address the evidentiary disputes 
in their findings. They simply entered conclusionary findings 
and no one can tell what particular facts were accepted to 
arrive at the conclusion. For example, on the Lowry 
matter, there really isn't any doubt that the assertion 
being made by the Bar Commission was that as the money was beinq 
received from Boothe and Gardner, it was being commingled 
and not maintained in a trust account. As we indjcated in 
our initial brief, there is no evidence of such commingling 
on the Lowry account. This assertion is not challenged by 
the Bar Commission in its answering Brief, but it says that 
after a number of years, Appellant closed out his trust 
account and took the remaining money, and this, they say in 
their answering Brief, is the commingling complained of. 
It is not the commingling they charged. It is not the 
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corruningling they tried to prove. It would not appear to 
be the corruningling which the hearing examiners refer to in 
par. 4(g) of their findings. The hearing examiners conclud~ 
that Appellant "failed to maintain the funds collected in a 
separate trust account, and corruningled the same with his own 
funds." In Count I, par. 2 of the complaint, the charge is 
As we pointed out in our initial brief, there is no 
showing that he did not "maintain" the Lowry funds in his 
trust account. There is no showing that he "commingled" 
the Lowry funds with his other funds. He had a separate trus: 
account, and as far as this record shows, all of the Lowry 
funds went into it. Several ·•ears aft er he had closed 
his private practice and his ':rust acconnt had become inactive 
he closed out his trust account, but that does not fit ejthrr 
the charge in the complaint nor the language of the finding, 
and the failure of the hearin'] eoxaminers Lo address the-' [,J'<'c' 
evidentiary disputes makes it impossible for us to know what 
they in fact intended to find. Failure to maintain a trust 
account, and the commingling of client's funds is one thing. 
Closing out a dormant trust account lung after he had gone 
out of the private practice is another. 
One other example will demonstrate this fully. It is 
argued by the Bar Commission on page lJ tha1- in the Piepen-
burg matter, ~-he statement L·· che 1pp1 Ua"l -1~ I (J\', )J( 
expected the jury to vote was made as a part of the 
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interview which took place at the counsel table, with the 
reporter taking notes. Appellant testified that he did not make 
that statement as a part of that interview (R.374). He had 
an interview with Mr. Horton at counsel table, which Appellant 
expected to be published. (R.370). He was asked some further 
questions on an informal basis as he left the courthouse to 
go out onto the street. (R. 374). Horton said these state-
,;,):_ ,_cd at counsc I 
table in the courtroom, (R.133), or may have occured as they 
left the building. {R.149). The hearing examiners did not 
address this conflict in the testimony at all, and yet the 
Bar Commission argu~s on p.9 of its brief that all of the 
statements concerning how the jury would vote took place as a 
part of the interview at counsel table. 'rJ,c; hea:ring examiners 
did not so find. In arguing the case Lu Li, .Ls court, the Bar 
Commission is not entitled to represent that the hearing 
examiners considered that dispute in the evidence, and resolved 
it in favor of the Bar. We cannot tell, and neither can anyone 
else, whether the hearing examiners believed Appellant that 
this conversation about how the jury would vote took place 
as they left the courthouse building, and still concluded 
that this violated the canons. If it took place at counsel 
table with the reporter taking notes, ~n a formal interview 
which the Appellant admitted he intended to be published, the 
conclusion that he should have expected it to be published is 
fully supµorted. If it took place in an intormal atmosphere, 
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as they walked out of the building to go to lunch, it present 
the matter in an entirely different light. The hearing exam-
iners ignored this co~flict, and made no finding at all rega~ 
ing it. The Bar Commission argues (p.10) that it wouldn't 
make any difference if the interview took place on the way 
out of the building, and it wouldn't make any difference if 
the reporter kned of th<e )udcw's c "'ccrn dbout 1-J1r~ ·ju:ry. We 
think it does make a difference, and that the hearing examiner 
should have addressed these evidentiary conflicts. Since 
they did not do so, we think we are fully warranted in asking 
the court to examine the evidence. We emphasize that the Bar 
Commission could not have done so, because the findings made 
did not address the problem, and the transcript of the evident 
was not available. 
POINT IV. THERE WAS A FAILURE TO ACCOUN'I' TO 
LOWRY AND EMARINE, BUT THE CIR·-
CUMSTANCES ARE CRITICALLY IMPORTANT. 
The findings on the failure Lo account are sirr~ly 
"bare-bones" conclusions, that there was such a failure. 
This is all that the Bar Commission could have known, 
because the findings contain nothing else, and the evidence 
was not transcribed. Further, the oral arguments were not 
even taken down by the reporter. So the Bar Commission had 
nothing to guide it but the conclusion that there had been a 
failure to account - but none of the circumc;tance:c; or 
particulars before it. 
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The uncontraverted evidence shows that for a long 
period of time Mr. Hansen had made collections, deposited the 
money to his trust account, advised the client that the 
money had been received, and after the check had cleared, 
promptly made the disbursement. Then he closed down his 
private practice, discharged his regular help, and moved his 
records, books, etc., into his home. His family assisted 
him in keeping the records and making lhc deposits, and his 
longtime secretary came in for a period of time, for about 
one day a week. (See p. 26 of our initial brief.) During 
this period of time, there were a half dozen instances where 
the Emarine money was deposited in his law account, rather 
than in his trust account, but disbursement was immediately 
made, and this inadvertent commingling caused no harm (see 
our initial brief p.29). 
Admittedly, some collections were made after he closed 
his office, and his system for accounting and disbursement 
did not function properly. There is absolutely no evidence 
of an intention on his part to keep the funds or conceal from 
his client that he had made the collection. In fact, the 
failure to disburse came to light when the Appellant, on his 
own volition, sent an affidavit to Mrs. Emarine showing the 
monies collected and the monies still due from her ex-husband. 
She realized that some of the money collected had not been 
remitted to her and she so advised the Appellant. Appellant 
could not find his file, and asked her for help to straighten 
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out the account. In this context, the Appellant admits that 
he had not accounted, and that he could not account, because 
he could not find his files. 
This is a circumstance that the Bar Commission could nol 
have known from the findings, because the findings don't 
reflect it. It is a circumstance that the Bar Commission 
could not ha're considered because t-.he ev.i.dence had not bE~r'n 
c.ranscribed uria .vas not oefore it.. l'his .is :oJJOtlignt.cd on 
pages 16 and 17 of the Bar Commission's brief. On page 16 thr 
conclusionary findings are noted. On page 17 it is stated 
that "it is apparent that the Bar Commission took into account 
matters of "so-called mitigation." The bric~f then reasons, 
otherwise the penalty would have been more severe. Surely, 
the findings do not reflect the circumstances, and surely tl!e 
Bar Commission did not have the transcript. r1•hese were mitiqc· 
ting circumstances. The Appellant did have a system which had 
function~d well. The commingling of several payments was 
inadvertent and caused no harm. He otherwise held the 
Emarine and Lowry monies separate 1 'om his own funds unti] 
he closed his dormant trust account. In the early years he 
notified them of the collections. He paid them promptly until 
he closed his office and it was thereafter that the system 
failed to function properly. He then brought Mrs. Emarinc's 
attention to monies 1vhich had bec.·n collect Gd, when he sent t 0 
her an affidavit for her signature--the aff.in0•.rit rpfJcr1r'r1 
the monies collected. She knew she had not rGceivcd all ol 
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them, and asked for an accounting, but he could not there-
after find his files. The fact that he closed his office 
and separated himself from his longtime help, did not 
relieve him of the legal duty to account for and pay over the 
money to his clients, but it is crystal clear that he was not 
intentionally failing to account or failing to pay. When the 
problem surfaced, he was in the middle of an election cam-
paisr1. 
coming to him through the press. His files were in numerous 
cardboard boxes, and the Emarine file could not be located. 
As soon as he was able to identify the money that he owed, 
he paid it, and on the initial demand, he deposited the full 
amount then demanded with the court. 
We simply are asking the court to consider these cir-
curnstances and are pointing out to the court that the Bar 
Conunission didn't and couldn't have done so, because the 
findings do not reflect them at all, and the transcript and 
arguments were not available. 
POIHT V. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS MORE 
THAN A TECHNICAL DEFENSE. 
The argument at page 18 that the duty to account con-
tinued up to the filing of the complaint with the Bar is 
without merit. The statute of limitations commences 
to run when the duty matures. On a common debt, the duty to 
pay continues up until the time the debt is paid or discharged, 
liut the c;tcitutc starts to run 1.'hr>n the duty to pay matures 
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:Jr r:, I _1_1 ',!I 1.'1 )(l(J[ lJ' ('(.) 1 1:()1 ( i l•,:11 
three years before the filing of the complaint with the Bar. 
As noted on page 20 of the Bar Commission's brief, Mrs. Lowr\ 
made a request for an accounting on May G, 1968. The duty tG 
account matured at least by that time. Part of the problem 
the Lowry case was the inability of the Appellant to find 
his files and records, and part of that problem is the result 
of the lapse of time--the ~ery reason for the imposition of ~ 
.s Ld ~ u tt_ ·~· f I_ l rr. it·.-;_ 
The technical defense as to Mrs. Lowry being a client 
is again a matter of substance. The client in the lawsuit 
was Franklin Life Insurance Co., (See Exs. 8 and 9). Mr. 
Lowry was the agent, and Appellant dealt directly with Mr. 
Lowry and remitted the money to him. When Mr. Lowry died, 
his wife became his executor, and Ln thi1t capacity the Appe] 
lant dealt with her. However, he .11as never :cepref~ented hr:J 
in her individual capacity as a client. Mrs. Lowry recogni;-.c 
Franklin Life as the client and wrote she would have to ask 
the company to change attorneys. (Ex. 3) . She admits that f;J1e 
never met Mr. Hansen, never talked to him in per son or by p) 11 • 
and never received a letter from him (H. 20), and we do not be-
lieve that the Bar established an attorney-client relationsh0 
with her as an individual. She did not file a complaint on 
behalf of Franklin Life nor as executor of the estate of Mr 
Lowry, and the complaint filed was long after the statute 
of limitations had run. As noted on p.22 of the Bar's brief, 
the "eleven year old file" show0·1! nu acLion. 
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find all of his records nor reconstruct an eleven year old 
file. 
Dated this 30th day of June, 1978. 
Edward W. Clyde ~ 
(AJ, 1, ! 'V{?}-:1;?-,;,0-c'>-
W .L ll i an1 G. -Gibbs-- ----
Attorneys for Appellant 
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